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Abstract
Core equivalence and shrinking of the core results are well known for economies.
The present paper establishes counterparts for bargaining economies, a specific class
of production economies (finite and infinite) representing standard two-person bar-
gaining games and their continuum counterparts as coalition production economies.
Thereby we get core equivalence of the Nash solution. The results reconfirm the
Walrasian approach to Nash bargaining of Trockel (1996). Moreover we establish
the same speed of convergence as is known from Debreu (1975) and Grodal (1975)
for replicated pure exchange economies and for regular purely competitive sequences
of economies, respectively.
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1 Introduction
The Nash solution of two person bargaining games introduced by Nash (1953) has been
characterized in manifold ways. Some of them hint to the fact that it reflects some
kind of immunity against strategic exploitation. So does Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating
offer game whose subgame perfect equilibrium approaches the Nash solution the closer
the less the discounting of future is by the strength of alternative future options. Also
Trockel’s (1996) Walrasian characterization of the Nash solution reflects the pressure of
competition providing sufficient outside options. In the latter approach, following ideas
of Shapley (1969), the two players’ utilities are treated as the two commodities in an
artificial economy with production and private property.
The Walrasian characterization establishes the vector λ in Shapley’s λ-transfer value as
a competitive price system thereby proving a conjecture of Shubik (1985).
In the present paper we relate the Nash solution with the Edgeworthian rather than
the Walrasian version of perfect competition. To do so, we define an artificial coalition
production economy (cf. Hildenbrand (1974)) representing a two person bargaining game.
In a similar way the Nash solution has been applied in Mayberry et al. (1953) to define
a specific solution for a duopoly situation and comparing it with other solutions, among
them the Edgeworth contract curve. The relation between these two solutions will be the
object of our investigation in this paper.
Though it would not be necessary to be so restrictive we define a two person bargaining
game as the closed subgraph of a continuously differentiable strictly decreasing concave
function f : [0, 1] −→ [0, 1] with f(0) = 1 and f(1) = 0.
S := subgraphf := {(x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1]2|x2 ≤ f(x1)}
The normalization reflects the fact that bargaining games are usually considered to be
given only up to positive affine transformations. Smoothness makes life easier by admit-
ting unique tangents.
The model S is general enough for our purpose of representation by a coalition production
economy. In particular, S is the intersection of some strictly convex comprehensive set
with the positive orthant of R2.
2 The basic model
Define for any S as described in section 1 a two person coalition production economy ES
as follows:
2
ES := ((ei,%i, Yi)i=1,2, (ϑij)i,j=1,2) such that
ei = (0, 0), x = (x1, x2) %i x′ = (x′1, x′2)⇔ xi ≥ x′i, i = 1, 2
ϑ11 = ϑ22 = 1, ϑ12 = ϑ21 = 0, Y1 = Y2 = (
1
2
)S
The zero initial endowments reflect the idea that all available income in this economy
comes from shares in production profits.
Each agent owns fully a production possibility set that is able to produce for any x ∈ S
the bundle (1
2
)x without any input.
Both agents are interested in only one of the two goods called “agent i′s utility”, i = 1, 2.
Without any exchange agent i would maximize his preference by producing and consuming
one half unit of commodity i and zero units of commodity 3− i, i = 1, 2.
However, the agents would recognize immediately that they left some joint utility unused
on the table.
Given exchange possibilities for the two commodities they would see that improvement
would require exchange or, to put it differently, coordinated production (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1
The point (1
2
, 1
2
) corresponds to the vector of initial endowments, the set S1 := S ∩
({(1
2
, 1
2
)}+R2+) to the famous lens and the intersection of S1 with the efficient boundary
of S, i.e. S1 ∩ ∂S, to the core in the Edgeworth Box. This is exactly what Mayberry and
al. (1953, p. 144) call the Edgeworth contract curve in their similar setting.
3
The according notions of improvement and of the core are analogous to the ones used for
Coalitional Production Economies by Hildenbrand (1974, p. 211).
Y˜ : {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}} =⇒ R2 with Y˜ ({1}) = Y1, Y˜ ({2}) = Y2, Y˜ ({1, 2}) = S, is the
production correspondence, which is additive, as Y ({1} ∪ {2}) = Y1 + Y2 = S.
An allocation xi = ((xi1, x
i
2))i=1,2 for ES is T -attainable for T ∈ {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}} if∑
i∈T x
i ∈ Y˜ (T ); it is called attainable if it is {1, 2}-attainable.
An allocation (x1, x2) can be improved upon by a coalition T ∈ {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}} if there
is a T -attainable allocation (y1, y2) such that ∀i ∈ T : yi i xi.
The core of ES is the set of {1, 2}-attainable allocations that cannot be improved upon.
The analogous definitions hold for all n-replicas ESn of ES, n ∈ N.
Notice that our choice of Yi = (
1
2
)S, i = 1, 2 ensures the utility allocation (1
2
, 1
2
) for the
two players in case of non-agreement. This differs from Nash’s status quo or threat point
(0, 0).
Formalizing an n-replica economy ESn is standard. All characteristics are replaced by n-
tupels of identical copies of these characteristics. In particular ESn has 2n agents, n of each
of the two types 1 and 2. And the total production possibility set for the grand coalition
of all 2n agents is nS.
Although the use of strict convex preferences as in Debreu and Scarf (1963) is not available
here a short moment of reflection shows that a major part of their arguments can be used
in our case as well.
In the case of a continuum of agents a coalition production economy representing the
bargaining game S is a map
E˜S : ([0, 1],B[0, 1], λ) −→ 2R2+ × R2+ × C◦(S)× {0, 1}[0,1] : t 7→ (Y˜ (t), et, ut, ϑt),
with Y˜ (t) := S, et = (0, 0), ut := 1[0, 1
2
](t) · proj1 + 1] 1
2
,1](t) · proj2
for all t ∈ [0, 1]. For each t the share function ϑt is given by ϑt : [0, 1] −→ {0, 1} : s 7→
ϑt(s) := δt,s(Kronecker delta).
An allocation x˜ : [0, 1] −→ [0, 1]2 is T -attainable for T ∈ B[0, 1] if ∫ x˜(t)λ(dt) ∈ ∫
T
Y˜ (t)λ(dt) =
λ(T )S.
A [0, 1]-attainable allocation x˜ can be improved upon by a coalition T ⊂ B[0, 1] via a
4
T -attainable allocation y˜, if λ a.e. in T : ut(y˜(t)) > ut(x˜(t)). The core of ES is the set of
attainable allocations that cannot be improved upon.
3 Core equivalence
Consider S as illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2
It is well known that the vector (N2, N1) is normal to ∂S at the Nash solution N of S.
For any x ∈ ∂S with x1 > N1, and thus x2 < N2 we have:
(N2, N1) · (x1, x2) ∈ [(N2, N1) · (1, 0), (N2, N1) · (N1, N2)] = [N2, 2N1N2].
Therefore we get
(N2, N1) · (x1, x2) = (N2, N1) · (αxN1, αxN2) = 2αxN1N2 for some αx ∈ [ 12N1 , 1].
The efficient point x can only be realized by the grand coalition [0, 1] if λ a. e. agent
produces x. Clearly, x is allocated to the agents in such a way that each agent in [0, 1
2
]
receives (2x1, 0) and each agent in ]
1
2
, 1] receives (0, 2x2). The idea for the construction of
a coalition Cx that improves upon x is as follows. Let all members of Cx produce some
alternative point more favorable for type 2 agents, hence less favorable for type 1 agents.
But choose the set Cx1 of type 1 agents in C
x so small that by allocating among them
equally the whole production of good 1 each of them is even better off than before.
The type 2 agents improve by choosing that alternative point in such a way that the
increase in production of good 2 per capita overcompensates the loss caused by the fact
5
that only few type 1 agents are contributing to the production of good 2.
First we choose xˆ := x + βx(−x1, x2) in such a way that it is in the segment [0, N ]. As
(−N1, N2) is steeper than (−x1, x2) we know that xˆ ∈]0, αxN [.
Now choose a small set Cx1 of type 1 agents of measure α
x
1 > 0 and a set C
x
2 of type 2
agents of measure αx2 > α
x
1 with α
x
2 <
1
2
.
Denote the union of these two sets Cx. So Cx has the measure αx1 + α
x
2 . Let each of the
members of Cx produce xˆ := ((1− βx)x1, (1 + βx)x2).
Their total production is (αx1 + α
x
2)((1− βx)x1, (1 + βx)x2).
We want to reallocate this by distributing equally the total amount of good i among type
i agents, i = 1, 2 in such a way that each agent gets exactly what he received from x.
Hence we must have:∫
Cx
((1 − βx)x1, (1 + βx)x2)dλ = (αx1 + αx2)((1 − βx)x1, (1 + βx)x2) = (αx1 2x1, αx2 2x2)
=
∫
Cx1
(2x1, 0) d λ+
∫
Cx2
(0, 2x2) d λ.
Therefore:
(αx1 + α
x
2)(1− βx) = 2αx1 and (αx1 + αx2)(1 + βx) = 2αx2 hence:
βx =
αx2−αx1
αx1+α
x
2
∈]0, 1[ and αx2 = 1+β
x
1−βxα
x
1 .
Among those αx1 , α
x
2 satisfying this equation we can indeed choose α
x
2 <
1
2
, as we did
before.
Up to now all agents in Cx are indifferent between the original production and allocation
and the new one.
Now assume that each member of Cx instead of xˆ even produces αxN > xˆ. If (αxN1−xˆ1, 0)
and (0, αxN2−xˆ2) are distributed equally among the type 1 and type 2 agents, respectively,
while xˆ is distributed as before, all members of Cx are better off than they were under
the production of x. Hence Cx improves upon x.
In an analogous way one can show that any x ∈ ∂S with x1 < N1, x2 > N2 can be
improved upon.
It is obvious that N itself cannot be improved upon by any coalition. Also it is known
from Trockel (1996) that N is the unique Walrasian allocation of E˜S and is therefore in
the core of the coalition production economy E˜S (cf. Hildenbrand (1974, p. 216). So we
have established that {N} = Core(E˜S).
6
This result could have been derived alternatively via Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 in
Hildenbrand (1974, p. 216) exploiting the fact that the unique Walrasian equilibrium is
the only quasi-equilibrium in E˜S and by Trockel (1996) coincides with the Nash solution
N of S.
Our proof has the advantage to hint to the way one may get a Debreu-Scarf type conver-
gence result for the core in our framework. This will be carried out in the next section.
4 An Edgeworth-Debreu-Scarf approach
In this section we are looking at the core of n-replicas ESn of the economy ES. Again it
suffices to look at S. Notice that it does not make any difference whether in an n-replica
economy every agent has the technology Y = 1
2n
S and the total production set is S or
wether each agent has Y = (1
2
)S and total production is nS. We will assume that each
agent in ESn owns a production possibility set Y := 12S as illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3
This time we assume w.l.o.g. that x ∈ ∂(1
2
S) and x1 <
1
2
N1, x2 >
1
2
N2. By choosing
n,m, k ∈ N, k < m ≤ n sufficiently large we can make the vector m−k
m+k
(x1,−x2) arbitrarily
small and, thereby, position the point x˜m,k := (x1, x2) +
m−k
m+k
(x1,−x2) in int(12S).
A coalition Cxn in the n-replica economy ESn of ES consisting of m agents of type 1 and k
agents of type 2 can realize the allocation (m+ k)x˜m,k =
((m+ k)x1 + (m− k)x1, (m+ k)x2 − (m− k)x2) = (2mx1, 2kx2).
7
This bundle can be reallocated to the members of Cxn by giving to each of the m type
1 agents (2x1, 0) and to each of the k type 2 agents (0, 2x2). Clearly, everybody gets
thereby the same as he received in the beginning when everybody produced x. Therefore,
nobody improves! However, for η > 0 sufficiently small x˜m,k ∈ int 1
2
S implies that
x˜m,k + ηN ∈ int1
2
S. Now reallocation of that bundle among the members of Cxn can be
performed in such a way that each type 1 agent receives (2x1+
m+k
m
ηN1, 0) and each type
2 agent gets (0, 2x2+
m+k
k
ηN2). Therefore x for every agent can be improved upon by C
x
n
via production of x˜m,k + ηN by each of its members. Again, the only element of ∂(1
2
S)
remaining in the core for all n−replications of ES is the point 1
2
N , i.e. the Nash solution
for 1
2
S.
Notice that any point y ∈ ∂(1
2
S) with y1 < x1 < N1 can be improved upon by the same
coalition Cxn via y˜
m,n + ηN with the same η by a totally identical construction of y˜m,n
from y.
The same is not true for z ∈ ∂(1
2
S) with x1 < z1 < N1.
Here the m−k
m+k
(z1,−z2) may require a larger m and k to make m−km+k (z1,−z2) small enough.
We may for any x ∈ ∂(1
2
S), x1 < N1 choose the m, k in the construction of x˜
m,k in such
a way that x˜m,k is on or arbitrary close to the segment [0, 1
2
N ]. This fact will help us in
the last section to drive the speed of convergence.
5 Speed of convergence
There are results in the literature on the speed of core convergence first by Debreu (1975)
for replica exchange economies and then, more generally, by Grodal (1975) for competitive
sequences of regular economies. They state that the distance between the core and the
Walrasian allocations of the economies converges to zero like 1/n, where n is the number
of agents in the economy.
In our framework we get an analogous result.
8
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Figure 4
For given 1
2
S and 1
2
N we associate with any pair k,m, 0 < k < m ≤ n the points
1
2
Nm,k := 1
2
(N1,
m
k
N2) and
1
2
Nm,k :=
1
2
( k
m
N1, N2).
Denote the unique point in the intersection
∂(1
2
S) ∩ [1
2
Nm,k, 1
2
Nm,k] by x
m,k.
This point can be improved upon by the coalition Cx
m,k
n via
xm,k+ m−k
m+k
(xm,k1 ,−xm,k2 )+ ηN for sufficiently small η > 0, as we have proved in section 4.
In fact for given m of all points xm,k the closest one to N is xm,m−1 =: xm (see Figure
4). So the length of the path on ∂(1
2
S) connecting xm with N is an upper bound of the
size of the core of ESm (or more precisely of that part of the core to the left of 12N). This
length is estimated from above by the number
max(||1
2
Nm − 1
2
N ||, ||1
2
Nm − 12N ||) with Nm := Nm,m−1, Nm := Nm,m−1.
But this number equals 1
2
max(( m
m−1 − 1)N2, (1− m−1m )N1) ≤ 12max(N1, N2) 1m−1 = 0( 1m).

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6 Concluding remarks
The present paper continues the idea of Trockel (1996) to approach cooperative games
with methods from microeconomic theory. Considering sets of feasible utility allocations
as production possibility sets representing the possible jointly “producable” utility alloca-
tions and tranformation rates as prices goes back to Shapley (cf. Shapley (1969)). See also
Mayberry et al. (1953). The possibility to get Core Equivalence of Walrasian equilibria of
the artificial bargaining economies and to derive an Edgeworth-Debreu-Scarf type conver-
gence result makes bargaining economies besides Edgeworth-Boxes or Robinson-Crusoe
economies another attractive class of economies for illustrative purposes. The identity of
the Walrasian equilibrium of a finite bargaining economy ES with the Nash solution of its
underlying bargaining game S stresses the competitive feature of the Nash solution.
Moreover the Nash solution’s coincidence with the Core of a large bargaining coalitional
production economy with equal production possibilities for all agents reflects a different
fairness aspect in addition to those represented by the axioms or by alternative charac-
terizations.
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